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Documenting the D-Day Dodgers
Canadian Field Historians in the
Italian Campaign, 1943-1945
Christine Leppard

T

he research for the operational
volumes of the official history
of the Canadian Army in the Second
World War was gathered by two
under-staffed and over-worked field
historical units. They were organized
and trained by Lieutenant-Colonel
C.P. Stacey, the official historian of
the overseas army, who was based
at Canadian Military Headquarters
in London. Stacey exercised close
direction over the units through
liaison visits, messages and frequent
letters. The mission of the 1st Canadian
Field Historical Section (1 CFHS),
which served in Italy from November
1943 to February 1945, was to gather
“top-down” documents for the
official record. Closer examination
of their work shows that 1 CFHS
was also recording a “worm’s eye”
view of the war through art and the
pages of the historians’ war diaries.
In doing so, field historians Captain
Eric Harrison and Captain Sam H.
Hughes developed valuable analyses
of Canadian military operations.
Secondarily, they made a valuable
contribution to our understanding
of civil affairs in Italy, and the social
history of the “D-Day Dodgers.”
Stacey arrived in London at
the end of 1940 with a mandate to
document the Canadian Army’s
overseas war. He was the right man
for the job. A professor at Princeton
University, a former officer in the

Abstract: The “top-down” official
record of Canada in the Italian
Campaign of the Second World War
was gathered by the 1st Canadian
Field Historical Section (1 CFHS),
which served in Italy from 1943 to
1945. Close study of 1 CFHS records
indicates that it was also documenting
a “worm’s eye” view of the campaign
through a war art program and in the
historians’ war diaries. Historians
Captain Eric Harrison and Captain
Sam H.S. Hughes offered preliminary
analyses on important campaign
questions, and, along with war
artists Captain Charles Comfort and
Lieutenant Lawren P. Harris, provided
material for future scholarship on the
social history of Canada in the Italian
campaign.

Canadian militia, and one of only two
Canadian university historians who
specialized in military history, Stacey
was prolific and committed. Still
the job became too big for one man,
no matter how industrious, as the
overseas force grew by 1942 into the
First Canadian Army comprising two
corps with a total of five divisions.1
Even so, Stacey had a difficult time
persuading his superiors that a
second historian was needed. For
a time it appeared that Gerald S.
Graham, of Queen’s University,
whose recent work had taken him
into naval and military history, might
be available, but he joined the navy.
George Stanley, the only Canadian
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historian other than Stacey to have
focussed on military history in his
graduate studies and publications,
initially refused Stacey’s invitation,
but then later accepted. Stanley, who
was serving in an infantry battalion
in Canada when Stacey contacted
him, was a graduate of Oxford
University, and in civilian life had
been a professor of history at Mount
Allison University.2 Stanley finally
arrived in London only in October
1942.
Canadian troops had stood on
guard in England, a vital role in
1940 and the first part of 1941 when
a German invasion had been a real
possibility. Thereafter the Canadians’
main purpose had been to prepare
for an Allied return to Europe, but
strategic circumstances repeatedly
delayed that major operation. When,
in August 1942 a large Canadian
force built around the 2nd Canadian
Infantry Division (CID) carried out
a raid on the French port of Dieppe,
Stacey learned the hard way that
when Canadian units went into
action historians needed to go with
them. Stacey was not warned of the
raid and was on leave in August – his
first holiday in the nearly two years
he had been at CMHQ, London. The
Dieppe operation was an unmitigated
debacle that cost the 2nd CID 3,367
casualties. Stacey scrambled to
collect all of the information that he
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Colonel C.P. Stacey, the official historian
of the overseas Canadian army, was
responsible for setting up the field
historical sections. He exercised close
direction over the units through liaison
visits, messages and frequent letters.

could including first-hand accounts
from Canadian officers and soldiers
who returned to England. Such an
after-the-fact effort involved many
compromises, and the lessons were
not lost on Stacey. He had to have
advanced notice of future operations,
and historians had to be attached to
formations in the field so they could
immediately gather and collate
documents, and interview officers as
soon as possible after combat actions
before the passage of time blurred
memories.3
There was precedent for this
work. During the First World War, the
ambitious Canadian businessman,
member of the British Parliament, and
socialite, Max Aitken, was Canada’s
“Eye Witness” of the war. As selfappointed historian of the Canadian
Expeditionary Force, Aitken travelled
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behind the front interviewing soldiers
for accounts he rushed into print in
newspapers to promote the Canadian
effort. He drew on this material to
publish one of the first monographs
about Canada’s part in the war effort,
Canada in Flanders, which became an
instant best seller when it appeared
in 1916.4
During the Second World War,
the Americans also employed field
historians. The idea originated with
the Harvard maritime historian
Samuel Eliot Morison, the Pulitzer
Prize-winning author of a book
about Christopher Columbus. 5 To
better appreciate the difficulties of
Columbus’s voyage, Morison sailed
the explorer’s route across the Atlantic
Ocean. In 1942 he pitched the same
concept to the United States Navy,
arguing that he could write a better

history of the war if he went to sea.6
After lobbying President Roosevelt,
who was a vocal proponent of a
comprehensive history, Morison set
sail. Ultimately his work was essential
in convincing the US Army Historical
Branch that battle reports, war dairies
and message logs inadequately
depicted what happened on the
battlefield.7 Trained historians were
made “combat historians” and sent
overseas to interview rank and file
soldiers. These interviews featured
prominently in the American Forces
in Action pamphlet series that began
publication in 1943. The initiative
for the series had come directly
from General George C. Marshall,
chief of staff of the US Army, who
particularly wanted to have the
pamphlets distributed in military
hospitals “to help [wounded soldiers]
understand why their sacrifices were
necessary.”8
The British, according to Stacey,
“scorned” the idea of placing
historians in the field to conduct
interviews. Instead, they preferred
to keep their historical work in the
Cabinet Office, relying on war diaries
to construct the chronology. They did,
however, coordinate a widespread
effort to gather documents for
archival keeping, and made extensive
preparations for their official history
while the war was still on.9
Stacey did not have the
manpower to employ “combat
historians” the way the Americans
did, but in October 1942 the Canadian
Army agreed that one historical
officer should be attached to each
headquarters in the field. Stacey had
hoped to send Sam H.S. Hughes
to gather documents and conduct
interviews with 1st Division when

2
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Far right: Captain S.H.S. Hughes by
Charles Comfort. Hughes was Stacey’s
first choice to accompany 1st Division to
Sicily. Hughes did take over from Sesia
when the fighting moved to the Italian
mainland.
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in September. In Italy, at places
like Ortona and the Hitler Line,
the Canadians waged some of their
toughest battles of the war.
Two months into the campaign
the Canadian presence in Italy
expanded, with the dispatch from the
United Kingdom of I Canadian Corps
headquarters and 5th Canadian
Armoured Division (CAD). The size
of the field historical section grew
accordingly. Eric Harrison was sent
to Italy in command of 1 CFHS which
was responsible for documenting
the actions of I Corps. Harrison
was a history professor at Queen’s
University, and he was not a military
historian. 15 Like Sam Hughes and
most Canadian historians of the day,
they studied constitutional, economic
and social political history.16
In autumn 1943, having earned
much-needed respect for the field
historians among the combat
formations, Sesia was relieved by
Hughes, who, under Harrison’s
command, took over the responsibility
for gathering documents from 1st
Division. Ogilvie had come down
with malaria in Sicily, so he was
relieved by Captain Charles Comfort,
an art history professor from Toronto.
Comfort was joined by Lieutenant
Lawren P. Harris, son of the Group

CWM CN 19710261-2206

Right: Captain A.T. Sesia (left, shown
here visiting Mount Vesuvius with a
guide and Private Heaton) was the first
historian assigned to First Canadian
Infantr y Division for the Sicilian
Campaign.

the First World War, to record the
Canadian effort. With the help and
support of Stacey, Massey established
a formal army art program that
was administered by the historical
section.11
Although not a trained historian,
Sesia proved effective in recording
1st Division’s operations in Sicily in
July-August 1943, and his efforts have
been well documented elsewhere.12
Most importantly, Sesia was an
ambassador for the historical section
among 1st Division officers. At the
same time he was able to provide
information and advice from which
Stacey “codified” a set of instructions
to “clarify things generally” and
assist future field historians “in
[their] relationships both with
formation headquarters and with
other historical officers in the theatre,
whose work [they had] the task of coordinating.”13 The efforts of Ogilvie
later prompted Stacey to write, “I
know of no other pictorial record of a
campaign anywhere to match the one
Ogilvie made in Sicily.”14 Sesia and
Ogilvie had done important work.
By the end of the Sicilian
campaign, the Allies decided that
they would maintain pressure on
the Germans retreating to Italy, by
crossing the straits of Messina and
assaulting the beaches at Salerno
Canadian War Museum (CWM) CN 19760583-026

it participated in the Allied invasion
of Sicily in July 1943. Hughes, the
grandson of the infamous First
World War minister of militia, Sir
Sam Hughes, was an Oxford-trained
historian in modern European
history. When the war broke out in
1939, Hughes was embarking on a
law career at Osgoode Hall. He joined
the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps
and later the Queen’s Own Rifles, and,
after completing two of three years
of law school, the future Ontario
Supreme Court judge went overseas.
In June 1942, he was appointed
to Operations and Intelligence at
CMHQ, in an office located next
door to Stacey. Upon finding out
that the Canadians were to be sent
to the Mediterranean theatre, Stacey
asked Hughes if would like the job as
historical officer. Although Hughes
immediately agreed, it was not to
be.10 Instead, the job went to Captain
A.T. Sesia, an intelligence officer in
1st Division. The idea of giving an
historian – an outsider to the family
of the combat formation’s staff –
extraordinary access to the inner
sanctum of planning, administration
and operations was a new concept,
and clearly the division’s general
staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel
George Kitching, preferred that such
a sensitive mission should be carried
out by one of his own officers. With
Sesia went war artist Lieutenant Will
Ogilvie, recruited by Canadian High
Commissioner Vincent Massey, who
since 1939 had pressed tirelessly
for an art program, inspired by
the one set up by Beaverbrook in
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William Abernathy Ogilvie – Company Headquarters, 1943.
Ogilvie’s paintings in Sicily as the official war artist prompted C.P. Stacey to write: “I know of no other
pictorial record of a campaign anywhere to match the one Ogilvie made in Sicily.”

of Seven painter and a noted artist in
his own right.
Assembling comprehensive “topdown” documentation of the war was
the historians’ primary objective in
Italy. In an era when historical practice
was still profoundly influenced by
Leopold von Ranke’s “scientific”
approach, this meant paying
assiduous attention to “the facts.”
Stacey directed 1 CFHS to get “the
raw material clearly and accurately
on paper, send it to [CMHQ],” where
the final job of writing narratives
would be done.17 Arguably their most
important, and certainly their most
frustrating assignment was to oversee
the writing of war diaries by unit
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intelligence officers, most of whom
were utterly unschooled in historical
practices. They were also instructed to
collect communications from among
Canadian units, and with higher level
British and Allied headquarters in
Italy, so that historians would be able
to contextualize Canadian operations.
Finally, these records were to be
supplemented by interviews with
Canadian officers.18
Although the ultimate purpose
was to provide material for the
published official histories of the
army, there were immediate needs.
Operational lessons documented
by the field historians were collated
into “Extracts from War Diaries and

Memoranda” by Stacey’s office in
London and provided to Canadian
units training for the eventual assault
on Northwest Europe.19 Stacey also
drew on the whole body of his
correspondence with Harrison and
the latter’s reports so that the 2nd
Canadian Field Historical Section
that would accompany the Canadians
to France would to benefit from the
experiences in Italy.
Tim Cook, in Clio’s Warriors,
observed that “these historians
[were] essentially schooled to place
value on ‘great men and great events’
rather than in social history from
the ground up, it is unfortunate,
if understandable, that a valuable

4
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opportunity was lost in failing to
record the private’s view of the
war.”20 It was as much a practical as a
philosophical issue, as the systematic,
large-scale recording necessary to
capture soldiers’ perspectives was
far beyond the limited resources
available to Stacey.
Yet, Stacey and 1 CFHS did
not ignore the view from the slittrench in favour of the perspective
from headquarters. One of the
fundamental purposes – and
achievements – of the war art program
was to capture the experience of the
front lines. As Harrison later put
it “Comfort’s mission… [was] as a
soldiering artist.”21 Since the artists
were contributing to the historical
record, they were subject to the same
standards of precision and accuracy
that Stacey applied to Harrison
and Hughes. The ever-watchful
history chief, for example, advised
Comfort and Harris’ successors in
Italy, MacDonald and Tinning, to
reconsider their subject matter, as he
felt they put too much emphasis on
landscape scenes and not enough on
Canadian troops. Without exposing
themselves to much danger, they
somehow needed to get closer to
operational subjects.22
Comfort, in Harrison’s view, set
the standard for war art. “He [was]
acutely aware of both the immediate
and the long-term importance of
the work he [was] doing and [was]
therefore the more concerned with
the fact that his production [had]
been cut down by about half as a

CWM CN 19710261-2308
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Top: Charles Comfort – Via Dolorosa.
Eric McGeer commented that this
painting of “the road of sorrows” is a
“hellish depiction of the fighting and
remains the defining image of the Battle
of Ortona.”
Right: Charles Comfort working on a
painting in Italy, March 1944.
Far right: Lawren P. Harris paints beside
the wreckage of a German PzKpfW IV
tank, Italy, March 1944.
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result of the conditions under which
it [had] to be carried on.” 23 The
winter months were cold and rainy –
conditions not particularly conducive
to sketching, watercolour or oil
paintings. Yet, Comfort persevered
to paint with “complete objectivity,”
projecting onto the canvas “what he
[saw], directly, without elaboration,
and, as it were, without comment.”
In December 1943, he even followed
on the heels of the 2nd Brigade as it
waged a bloody battle to push the
1st German Parachute Division from
Ortona, the easternmost anchor on
the Germans’ winter defensive line.
Comfort sketched the scene before
12
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the battle had completely ended,
an initiative that Harrison strongly
commended “from the historian’s
point of view.”24
Through the war art program,
the historical section created a history
of the campaign that did more
than complement and supplement
the written, photographic and
cartographic record.25 Massey and
Stacey were determined to display
the works as quickly as possible,
and made considerable efforts to
mount exhibitions in England and in
Canada during and immediately after
the war. While there was certainly a
propaganda element to these shows,

Members of the 1st Canadian Field
Historical Section set up a camp in
Italy next to their Humber. From left to
right: Captain Charles Comfort, Private
Heaton, Lieutenant William Ogilvie and
Captain A.T. Sesia.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stacey poses with
members of his staff in England: from
left to right: William Ogilvie, O.N. Fisher,
Captain Heathcote, L. Wrinch, Stacey,
Lieutenant Engler, Major A.T. Sesia, G.C.
Pepper, Captain G.R. Martin

Stacey’s primary purpose was to
bring out the “personal history”26
of the Canadian Army’s effort,
something quite different from the
top-down record of policy, training
and operations whose construction
was the historians’ primary mission.
The art was consciously directed
toward an audience much broader
than those who would be most
interested in the documentary record.
At the same time, Stacey made
further efforts to capture a wider
picture of the war by having the
field historians record their own
observations for inclusion in the
1 CFHS war diary. Each historian,
Stacey directed, should provide “a
useful commentary upon which
he himself sees of the campaign.”27
Harrison in particular recorded more
than his daily administrative duties,
and captured the sights, sounds and
smells of living and working in a
war zone. He included reports of
interviews he undertook informally
with rank and file soldiers. The
thoroughness of Harrison’s diary in
part reflected the fact that, unlike
many of the staff officers whom he
trained to write operational war
diaries – a task he once referred to
as “missionary work among the
heathen” – he was comfortable
with the pen.28 Yet he and Hughes
also repeatedly proved aware that
they were establishing an entire
field of history for generations of
historians, not just laying the ground
work for an operational official
history, by documenting a history
of the campaign that went beyond

LAC PA 114039
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the movements of companies and
battalions. Indeed, three themes
are prominent in the historians’
diaries: the fate of Italian towns and
countryside, the attitudes of Italian
citizens and their interactions with
the Allies, and impressions of the
daily lives of Canadian soldiers in the
front lines.
The beating taken by Italian cities
and the squalid living conditions that
resulted for the inhabitants never
ceased to move Harrison. Upon
reaching Catania on 11 November
1943, he observed the heavy toll of
the Allied bombardment, particularly
on the waterfront buildings, and
the “pervasive dirt and stink.”
Inflated prices and food shortages
plagued hungry Italians because
of the “successive occupations by
the Germans and the British having
apparently greatly diminished stocks
which under conditions could not
be replenished.” 29 Particularly

wrenching was the fate of the Roman
Basilica in Rocca, which he saw in
February 1944:
The church and the cloisters had
been hit by gun-fire, but the gaunt
structure itself remained, still a
landmark above the ADRIATIC and
the valley of the SANGRO, as it had
been since its foundation in the 8th
century. In the crypt were frescoes
with figures done in the transitional
manner of Cimabue: their earlyrenaissance faces looked down with
faint surprise on the soldiers of 5
[CAD]…who were using the crypt
as their mess.30

Still grimmer were Harrison’s
descriptions of Monte Cassino,
which he visited in mid-May, a month
after it was levelled by American
bombers. He was again mesmerized
by the total destruction of the ancient
architecture, although the human toll

captured his attention just as strongly.
“Unburied corpses, their limbs
fantastically deployed, still lay where
they had fallen, looking like waxen
dummies, dusty, bloated, exuding
aft, their necks lolling, their hair like
dried-out grass, their features gray,
remote, unhuman.” 31 Harrison’s
poignant descriptions of the carnage
of war were perhaps cathartic for
him, and he certainly understood this
part of his reporting as being essential
for future historians.
Harrison was especially
interested in the perceptions of the
Italian population – Hitler’s erstwhile
allies – and the picture that he
painted was complex. For example,
the residents of Taormina, whom
Harrison interviewed in his first few
days in Sicily, steadfastly blamed
American bombers for the damage
done to their town, maintaining that
the British planes had flown low
enough to pinpoint targets. Harrison

LAC PA 114039

Refugees returning to the ruins of Ortona after the battle, January 1944.
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recorded that he “had heard the
same story from other parts of Sicily.
Whether it is an accurate version of
what took place or merely Sicilian tact
is a moot point.”32
The citizens of Rome were more
appreciative of the Allies’ efforts,
having spent nearly a year under
Nazi occupation after the capitulation
of Benito Mussolini in July 1943.
Harrison arrived in Rome on 7 June
1944, just days after its liberation by
the US Fifth Army. “The city had not
yet recovered from the enthusiasm
and emotion...the people thronged
the streets smiled and waved.”
In the midst of their jubilation,
however, “it was observed that
they had not yet had time to take
down the anti-British and American
posters from their walls.” One poster
showed bombs marked “Made in
USA” plummeting towards cowering
women and children; it read: “These
are the Liberators.”33
Allied opinions of the Italians were
more consistent. In December 1943,

14
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Harrison spent time with the
Allied Military Government
(AMG), which had the role of
administering Italian towns
and re-establishing order
once the Germans had been
driven out. After witnessing
a Canadian major requisition
an apartment house in
Avellino, leaving the town’s
podesta (mayor) to find
alternate accommodations for
380 locals, he reflected that,
“one element in the problem
of dealing with the Italian
civil population was that they
did not regard themselves
as a conquered people and
expected rather to have things
done for them than to have
demands made upon them.”34 This
statement, of course, says as much
about Harrison as it does about the
Italians.
Harrison was sometimes placed
in the awkward position of recording
the absurd for posterity. In May
1944, for example, he spoke with
an AMG officer who had dealt with
seven cases of rape in one day, and
believed that the majority were not
committed by Canadians, but rather
by Germans who had crossed into the
Canadian area incognito. Harrison
neither confirmed nor denied this
unlikely allegation, evidence that
he understood his observations
were potentially sensitive. However,
while Harrison kept silent about his
own conclusions, he recorded the
officer’s opinion for future historical
research.35
Dealing with the Italian
p o p u l a t i o n wa s a n i m p o r t a n t
challenge that affected operational
efficiency and effectiveness. Another
was the condition of the country’s

infrastructure, whose appalling
weaknesses were exacerbated by war.
Combat often left roads impassable.
After the Battle for the Moro, the road
from San Leonardo was littered with
“trackless, turretless [tanks],” rusted
out anti-tank guns, and dismembered
Shermans.36 Simply moving about the
country was often an ordeal. On 21
January 1944 Harrison remarked that
he had “obtained a pretty clear idea
of the extraordinary difficulties of
maintaining road [communications].”
Not only did engineers regularly
have to widen roads, but they had to
clear them of mines for safe travel.
Harrison let the sappers do the
talking for him when he copied down
the verse written on three signs en
route to Rocca: “Wanted Combined
[Operations] on the Roads – Combine
with the Sappers – We Can Build
the Bridges if you can Look after the
Roads.”37 R.T. Currelly, who joined
Harrison’s staff as historical officer
of 5th Canadian Armoured Division,
noted in August 1944 that soldiers
learned to deal with bad roads just
as they did many other aspects of the
war:

LAC PA 144724

Eric Harrison, a history
professor at Queen’s University,
took command of 1 CFHS when
1st Canadian Corps became
operational in Italy.

In all this filth, fatigue and bodily
discomfort the same old time-worn
humour and perpetual good nature
persist. Someone’s truck slips on
a soft shoulder and rolls over. The
driver is sitting dejectedly in the
burning dust waiting, perhaps
hours, for a Recovery Lorry. Nearly
everyone who passes has something
to shout, such as “Wotcha thinkin’
about Jock?,” or “That’s a stooped
place to park!38

For Harrison and Currelly, the
effect of Italian roads on soldiers’
experiences was as interesting and
worthy of note as was its influence
on the conduct of operations.
To be sure, the historians were
primarily interested in how the
Canadians conducted operations
and documenting this was their

8
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core purpose. Since the end of the
war, historians have debated the
effectiveness of the Eighth Army’s
rigid artillery-based doctrine in Italy.
“The price paid for an overwhelming
emphasis on firepower was to
restrict the other half of the fire
and movement equation,” wrote
William McAndrew in 1987. Instead
of heeding Sun Tzu and “flowing
along paths of least resistance,”
the Canadians’ emphasis on rigid
artillery plans minimized their ability
to exploit unexpected opportunities.39
The field historians keyed in on this
issue as it was debated in the field.
Both General H.D.G. Crerar and
his successor as corps commander,

General E.L.M. Burns, believed
detailed preparations were necessary
before any assault on dug-in German
defensive positions. “It is a matter for
the record,” Harrison wrote, “that the
Corps [Commander] belonged to that
school of thought which preferred
thoroughness and deliberation to
the impetuousness which might
well have met with reverses at the
outset of this first commitment of
the [Canadian] Corps to an offensive
battle.”40
Others, like Lord Tweedsmuir,
the officer who led the Hastings and
Prince Edward Regiment up the backside of a Sicilian cliff to capture the
town of Assoro by stealth, lectured

that “great reliance had…to be placed
upon improvisation.” 41 Harrison
tended to agree with corps command.
For example, on the assault on the
Hitler Line in May 1944, Harrison
reported that “when the tension
broke and at the appointed [hour]
the barrage came screaming down, it
was evident that the deliberation with
which the assault had been prepared
would assuredly confirm the victory
with a minimum loss of life.”42 The
attention that Harrison devotes in
his war diary to infrastructure and
terrain suggests that his analysis was
formed, at least in part, by having
seen too closely the obstacles (manmade and natural) that restricted

Canadian trucks drive through the battered town
of Pontecorvo, Italy during the Hitler Line advance
Hitler Line, 24 May 1944.
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Canadian troops enter the village of San Pancrazio, Italy where the previous week German soldiers had massacred the
male inhabitants. The “D-Day Dodgers” fought a gruelling, attritional campaign in Italy where they served in the shadow
of events in Northwest Europe, but they were well served by efforts of 1st Canadian Field Historical Section to record their
accomplishments.

movement, including blown-bridges,
steep roads, vineyards, orchards,
stream networks, mountain ranges,
narrow valleys, and the ubiquitous
and capricious German 88s.
Harrison and Hughes believed
that “success” needed to be measured
not by the achievement of a breakout
– which never came – but by the
attrition of the enemy. In one report,
Hughes suggested it was laudable
that in the drudging months spent
pushing the Germans from their
“Winter Line” through Ortona

16
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towards Pescara, “a heavy toll had
been exacted from the obstinate
enemy.”43 This was not to say that
the historians were unaware when
operations fell short. For instance,
Harrison recorded in March that
“the front was strangely quiet…A
posture of defence had been assumed
and the verdict registered of a winter
campaign which had failed to achieve
its objectives.” 44 Nevertheless, the
historians concluded that over the
winter the Germans had been hit
hard, thrown back and were then

scrambling to save their defences at
Cassino.
The emphasis on destruction
of enemy forces was apparent in
Harrison’s discussion in his war diary
of the US Fifth Army’s liberation of
Rome, and word, two days later on 6
June 1944, that the Allies had landed
in Normandy.
The news [about the Normandy
l a n d i n g s ] wa s g r e e t e d w i t h
enthusiasm, but not without a hint
of regret that 1 [Canadian] Corps
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was no longer in the battle. For
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although the capture of Rome had
not been the primary objective of
the offensive…its liberation could
not but be regarded as a triumphant
climax to the dusty battles of the Liri
valley.45

While the glory of capturing
the capital would have been a wellearned honour, Harrison believed
that “the front was too narrow for
both the Fifth and British Eighth
Armies to converge upon a point of
small tactical importance.”46 Rome
was not the main objective – the
destruction of the German Army in
Italy was.
The slow slogging of attrition
had little glory for the men involved.
Stacey, while in Italy on a liaison visit
in March 1944, remarked:
It may be noted at this point
that our observation was that in
general the Canadian troops do not
like Italy. Complaints of the dirt
and squalor of the country were
universal; and it was obvious that an
unusually severe winter had been a
particularly unpleasant introduction
to the country. There is also some
feeling that the Italian campaign is a
“sideshow” by comparison with the
operations on the United Kingdom,
projected for North-West Europe.
Several officers remarked that it
was unfortunate that the Canadian
Army should be divided between
two theatres of war instead of acting
as a united force. There appeared to
be a very general envy of the troops
preparing for action in England,
and there was widespread interest,
evidenced by many questions, in
the prospect of the “Second Front.”
Nevertheless, the Canadian Troops
in Italy were, in general, obviously
in good heart, and were looking
forward to further action.47

Charles Comfort noted a similar
sentiment when he wrote in his

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009

Leppard - Documenting the D-Day Dodgers.indd 17

memoirs that shortly after the Battle
of Ortona a rumour swept through
1 CID that they were being moved
back to England in March. 48 The
rumour was unfounded and perhaps
just wishful thinking on the part of
battalion commanders, fatigued from
pushing their troops through the
inhospitable Italian peaks and gullies,
and incurring heavy casualties for no
apparent war-winning reason.
Soldiers fighting in Italy knew
that they were fighting in a secondary
theatre, while the “real war” was
fought in Northwest Europe, and
this opinion was duly recorded by
the field historians. By documenting
this perception among soldiers, the
field historians made an important
contribution to the interpretive
framework that has dominated the
study of the Italian theatre for the past
60 years. Nowhere is this interpretive
framework more apparent than in
the final pages of From Pachino to
Ortona, the preliminary account of
the Italian campaign published in
1946. In the conclusion, Stacey and
Hughes found it hard to explain
why the Canadians were in theatre.
The Canadian formations, however,
did have the honour of being among
the Allied forces that first breached
Fortress Europa, and could be proud
of their association with the renowned
Eighth Army and its leader General
Bernard Montgomery. The Canadians
who survived from “the Sicilian hills
swimming in the August heat to the
icy, shell-churned mud above the
Moro,” could rest assured that, as the
final line of the book declares, their
experiences were an inspiration to the
tens of thousands of other Canadians
poised to cross the Channel.49 It was a
fitting tribute to the D-Day Dodgers.
Stacey went to extraordinary
lengths to make certain that a
balanced and comprehensive record
of the Canadian Army’s effort in the
Second World War was kept. He
did this by ensuring that the officers
of No.1 Field Historical Section

understood and endeavoured to
meet those standards. Certainly,
as Harrison wrote in 1948, their
assignment to carry out research
in such depth reflected well on
the army: “in such a context of
success or failure, the admission of
the historian as eye-witness, crossexaminer, and custodian of the
evidence, asserts a confident will to
submit to trial by history.”50 The “topdown” documentation, including
interviews with key commanders
and staff officers, gathered by the
field historians as their primary
mission recorded decision-making
before, during, and after actions.
In their preliminary comments on
this material, the field historians
made important interpretations of
the Italian campaign, on specific
matters such as British and Canadian
attack doctrine, and on such broader
questions as the measures of success
in hard-fought battles of attrition. At
the same time, the work of the artists,
and the observations recorded by
the historians in their diaries, did
much to capture experience “from
the ground,” providing material
for future scholarship in new fields
of study on the social and cultural
dimensions of the war.
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